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Much of the consumption that matters for environmental sustainability is habitual, 
recurrent and ordinary.  Like it or not, strategies designed to steer behaviour in pro-
environmental directions have to grapple with this habitual aspect. Most attempts 
to do so treat habit as an obstacle to change, and as a type of behaviour that is 
automatic, frequent and set within a stable context. In analyses like these habits are 
behaviours that people pick up, have and occasionally lose. In this paper I explore 
the relevance and value of turning this topic around and of approaching it from the 
habit’s point of view. If we persist with this way of thinking, and if we assume that 
rather than acquiring habits we are acquired by them, familiar questions appear in 
a very different light and new ones arise. How do habits locate suitable carriers? 
How do habits, viewed as practices that require recurrent, consistent reproduction, 
relate to other less demanding pursuits? How is the rhythm of society defined by 
the sum total of habits? Can policy makers do anything to help sustainable habits 
capture large swathes of the population and edge other more damaging habits 
out of the way? In this paper I push such questions to the limit. From the vantage 
point afforded by this thought experiment I comment on the policy implications of 
conventional and practice-centric methods of conceptualising habit.
Introduction
Many of the most environmentally significant forms of domestic consumption are of 
the ordinary variety (Gronow and Warde 2001). Despite accounting for the majority 
of home energy use, patterns of heating, cooling, laundering and bathing/showering 
are rarely topics of explicit debate or deliberate decision-making. This is something 
of a problem for policy makers seeking to promote pro-environmental behaviour by 
means of price and persuasion. As Prendergast et al. point out, 
“Despite the common assumptions of economics in many circumstances, people, it 
turns out, often aren’t actually all that “rational” in their behaviours and decisions. They 
don’t conduct some sort of complicated cost-benefit analysis when faced with a choice. 
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In fact, they are just as likely to do what they have always done, what impulse tells them 
to do or what their neighbours or friends generally do” (2008, 6)
In this analysis, norms and habits constitute a behavioural realm that lies 
tantalisingly beyond the reach of instruments predicated on rational choice. Taking 
a broader view, habits are frequently thought to constitute obstacles to change, 
limiting the impact of otherwise effective policy measures (Darnton 2010). When 
framed in this way, the policy challenge is that of helping people unlock or break 
habits: freeing them to choose more sustainable ways of life and drawing their 
behaviour back into the zone of (anticipated) policy influence. The difficulty of course 
is that in lying outside the field of rational choice, habits are uniquely resistant to 
familiar forms of policy intervention. 
Concepts of habit have an ambivalent status within mainstream accounts of 
sustainable consumption, simultaneously affirming and challenging foundational 
assumptions about how people come to do what they do. On the one hand, the realm 
of habit is in effect defined in relation, and in opposition, to the more manageable 
territory of decision-making and choice. On the other hand, the very existence 
of habit, even as an exception, points to the salience of practical consciousness, 
shared convention, situation, history and context, all of which are marginalised 
in more classically rational theories of action. Most interpretations of what sets 
habit apart refer to features like those of automaticity; frequency and stable context 
(Darnton 2010). Habits consequently figure as behaviours that do not command 
much conscious attention; that happen often and that do not change, in part 
because relevant aspects of the surrounding environment are also unchanging. 
In this paper I take a different approach inspired not by the psychology or 
economics of behavioural change but by social theories of practice. Rather than 
thinking of habits – whether good or bad – as something that people pick up, have 
and occasionally lose, I explore the relevance and value of turning the topic around 
and of approaching it from the habit’s point of view.  Instead of defining habit as a 
sub-set of behaviour, characterised by distinctive driving or stabilising forces, I take 
habits to be practices that are recurrently and relatively consistently reproduced.  
There is no one clearly defined theory of practice, but there is a growing 
literature organised around a handful of shared understandings. One is that social 
practices, like football (Reckwitz 2002), Nordic Walking (Shove and Pantzar 2005) 
or showering on a daily basis (Hand, Shove et al. 2005)  have to be consistently 
reproduced if they are to persist and survive. This means that they need to capture 
recruits willing and able to keep them alive (Shove and Pantzar 2007). It therefore 
makes sense to think of people as creatures – in the sense of slaves – of the habit-
demanding practices to which they are host. The idea that we are, to different 
degrees, held in thrall by predatory practices is not as implausible as it might at 
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first appear. After all, such a view is entirely in keeping with Reckwitz’s observation 
that “In practice theory, agents are body/minds who ‘carry’ and ‘carry out’ social 
practices. Thus, the social world is first and foremost populated by diverse social 
practices which are carried by agents.” (Reckwitz 2002, 256). Being captured by a 
habit is not a necessarily unpleasant experience. Habits may offer carriers various 
benefits, simplifying daily life, bracketing out decisions and providing a measure 
of comfort, stability and order. Be that as it may, the purpose of this discussion is 
not to detail the qualities of habit from the perspective of the host, but to consider 
questions that arise if we assume that rather than acquiring habitual practices we 
are acquired by them. For example: 
• How do certain practices come to demand recurrent, habitual, reproduction?
• How do such practices locate and capture suitable carriers?
• What are the characteristics of habit-demanding practices?
• How do habit-demanding practices structure daily life and associated 
patterns of consumption? 
These are not issues around which more familiar debates about the strength of 
habits or their status as a type of behaviour revolve, nor do they relate to established 
schools of thought in public policy. They are nonetheless useful points of reference 
for this paper, the aim of which is to explore matters of habit from a practice-centric 
point of view. 
 In taking this project on I begin by commenting on the relation between habit, 
routine and practice. This allows me to home in on a handful of insights, derived 
from theories of practice, in terms of which the rest of the discussion is framed. 
In the second section I suggest that the analytic distinction between practice-as-
performance and practice-as-entity is useful in teasing out the levels at which 
recurrence and regularity are reproduced.  This sets the scene for a slightly more 
detailed account of when and how these features might become part of the proper 
conduct of a practice. In the third section I reflect on the benefits of becoming 
habitual, again taking the practice’s point of view. As indicated here, habit-demanding 
and non-habit-demanding practices compete for suitably committed carriers or 
hosts, the availability of which depends on the relative status and positioning of 
coexisting practices. By implication, sociotemporal rhythms and the persistence of 
shared habits are the collective outcome of encounters and competitions between 
variously demanding practices. In the fourth and final part I take stock of what a 
practice-based analysis of habit brings to the table and identify forms of policy 
intervention capable of promoting “good” habits and of limiting those that underpin 
unsustainable forms of consumption. 
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Habit, routine and practice
First, some definitions. I am going to use the term “habits” to refer to practices that 
are recurrently and consistently reproduced by suitably committed practitioners 
(people who enact the practice). By implication, all habits are practices, but not 
all practices demand habitual reproduction. So far so good, but is habit, then, a 
quality or a characteristic of a practice? Do habits constitute a type of practice? 
And if so, how are we to deal with the fact that the same practice, for example, 
taking a shower, might be a frequent event for some practitioner-showerers, but 
not for others? (Hand, Shove et al. 2005). One solution is to treat habit as a mode 
of enactment. 
A practice becomes habitual when it is routinely and consistently reproduced. In 
this context, the term “routine” represents and describes the regularity with which a 
practice is enacted. To say that a practice is routinely enacted, i.e. that it is habitual, 
is to say something about the timing and frequency of its performance. The idea 
of “a routine” is something else. For present purposes, “a routine” like a morning 
routine, or the Wednesday routine, has to do with the way in which multiple practices 
are ordered and scheduled. Those who have a routine are consequently those for 
whom identifiable time slots are recurrently filled with similar sets or sequences of 
practice. In taking this approach I emphasise the time and timing of practice and, 
later in the paper, consider the implications of such timing for the ways in which 
practices interact.
In the account provided so far the means by which a practice becomes habitual 
(meaning that it is regularly reproduced) seem fairly arbitrary – some people shower 
on a daily basis, others do not.  However, this overlooks the possibility that recurrent 
performance might be a necessary part of what constitutes proper enactment. At 
this point the story gets a bit more complicated. Up to now I have thought of habits 
as practices that happen to be recurrently enacted, but in some cases this habit-
aspect (i.e. recurrent timing) might be central to the practice itself. I have more to 
say about this in the next section but before moving on, it is important to comment 
on the related question of faithful or consistent reproduction. As indicated above, 
practices that are habitually enacted are relatively unchanging, despite repeated 
performance. Since consistency and recurrent reproduction do not always go 
together there is also more to say about how habit-like practices are faithfully re-
enacted over time. 
Not all practices have habit-like tendencies, meaning that not all require or 
seek regular, consistent performance. But if we are to think about the making of 
habit, here understood as the emergence and persistence of practices that make 
such demands, we need to think about two related questions. How do certain 
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practices come to depend on recurrent reproduction? And how is it that cohorts of 
practitioners fall in with these demands?
Recruitment and recurrent reproduction 
– performance and entity
 In tackling these questions it is useful to distinguish between practice-as-
performance and practice-as-entity. As Reckwitz explains, a practice exists as a 
“block” or “a pattern which can be filled out by a multitude of single and often 
unique actions” (Reckwitz 2002, 250). In this sense, a practice-as-an- entity exists 
between different moments of enactment (Shove, Watson et al. 2007). At the same 
time, practices exist as performances. It is through performance, through the 
immediacy of doing, that the “pattern” provided by the practice-as-an-entity is filled 
out, maintained and transformed. This analytic distinction allows us to see that 
while performances of a practice can become habitual for certain practitioners, this 
does not mean that the practice-as-entity is, of necessity, a habit in the sense that 
proper performance demands and depends on regular re-enactment.  
In short, practices-as-performances are commonly enacted in various ways, 
some more habitual (persistent and recurrent) than others. That said, certain 
practices-as-entities are evidently more demanding of their carriers than others, 
and to varying degrees, some do entail or imply frequent enactment. More broadly, 
the temporal demands associated with the proper performance of a practice vary 
widely. Some only demand irregular or brief moments of attention. Many persist 
(as entities) perfectly well for long periods without recurrent enactment: seasonal 
or weather dependent arrangements are often like this. Others command near 
constant attention. In distinguishing between these forms the basic question is 
whether the time and timing of performance is in some sense embedded in the 
elements of which a practice is composed. 
If practices-as-entities demand recurrent performance, on what is this 
requirement based? Does this necessity reside within the practice, and if so, where 
and how are these features of frequency and timing located? Reckwitz claims that 
a practice is “a routinized type of behaviour which consists of several elements, 
interconnected to one other: forms of bodily activities, forms of mental activities, 
‘things’ and their use, a background knowledge in the form of understanding, know-
how, states of emotion and motivational knowledge”(2002: 249). This sentence 
provides some useful clues. In theory, elements like those of understanding, know-
how, motivational knowledge and meaning are potentially capable of harbouring 
temporal injunctions. 
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 Kaufmann’s study of couples and their laundry provides some insight into how 
this works (Kaufmann 1998). A number of the people he interviewed talked about 
feeling impelled to do the ironing or the washing.  Drawing on these experiences 
Kaufmann writes about the sense of compulsion and the injunction to perform. 
When the pile of ironing grows so high, or when Wednesday evening comes around 
again, there are people for whom ironing-as-a-practice absolutely demands and 
habitually gets attention. For these individuals, the meaning of an appropriate 
performance, ironing properly, is inseparable from ironing regularly. 
However, this aspect of meaning is not all that is required. For ironing to be 
effectively and habitually reproduced, other elements need to be in place including 
materials (clothes, iron, electricity) and relevant levels and forms of competence. 
More abstractly, recurrent reproduction supposes that the elements of habit-like 
practices are themselves recurrently and reliably in place. 
This is crucial in that the continuity associated with habit depends on the 
possibility of consistent as well as recurrent reproduction. With many practices, 
repeat performance is transformative. For example, for any one practitioner, skill 
and know-how typically increase with experience.  With respect to practices-as-
entities, there are again many instances in which recurrent performance is itself 
a source of change. The recent history of snowboarding illustrates this point. As 
Franke and Shah’s (2003) study of consumer-user innovation demonstrates, new 
tricks and techniques are always being developed. As a result, the contours of 
snowboarding are continually evolving. For the most devoted practitioners, and for 
those at the cutting edge of such pursuits, habit (in the sense of faithful reproduction) 
barely exists: innovation is all.  In other situations the elements of a practice remain 
untouched by successive instances of enactment.
It is clearly important to distinguish between practices that are recurrently 
but unfaithfully performed (i.e. that are evolving all the time) and those that are 
recurrent but consistently or faithfully performed. As defined above, habits belong 
in this latter category. This suggests that habitually enacted practices are ones 
in which constituent elements of meaning, materiality and competence are 
themselves relatively stable. For one reason or another there is no competitive 
drive for “improved” performance, and little or no scope for building competence 
in ways that transform the contours of the practice-as-entity. With habits like those 
of taking a daily shower, one enactment is really very much like the next and little 
transformation goes on.  In other words, where practices are recurrently and 
faithfully reproduced, the elements of proper performance are established, settled 
and provisionally in place. 
These few comments help build up a picture of what habit formation might 
entail, from the point of view of a practice. If practices are to move into habit-terrain, 
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that is if they are to capture the resources and attention of carriers not once but 
time and time again, they probably need to associate recurrent enactment with the 
very meaning of performance.  They also need to ensure (in so far as practices 
can ensure anything!) that all the elements required for their ongoing enactment 
(the materials, competences and meanings) are readily and consistently available. 
Equally important they need to find ways of edging rival habit-demanding practices 
out of the way.
Habit and relations between practices 
It is to some extent true that time spent reproducing one practice cannot be 
devoted to another (Pred 1981).  It is also true that habit-demanding practices are 
distinctly hungry in that they require repeated performance. The precise nature of 
the demands they make depends on the duration of any one performance and on 
the frequency with which practices need to be enacted in order to meet internal 
standards of proper accomplishment. But in general, if habit-demanding practices 
are to survive they have to be capable of persistently and consistently colonising 
slots of time and other resources. This requirement puts them in quite specific 
forms of competition with other practices, some of which also make habit-like-
demands, others of which do not. As noted above, not all practices aspire to habit-
status but given that the number of potentially capable and committed carriers is 
inherently limited, there is some advantage in being regularly reproduced within an 
overall ecology of practice. 
For any one practice, becoming a habit (i.e. making habit-demands of carriers) is 
likely to involve displacing or reconfiguring others. Equally, for any one practitioner, 
being captured by a habit-demanding practice is likely to involve submitting to a 
(new) temporal pattern. At a minimum, time needs to be allocated, not once, but 
on a regular basis. This probably requires re-jigging other parts of the day, for 
example, rushing or abandoning other previously significant pursuits. The extent of 
change depends on exactly what the incoming habit-demanding practice requires 
in terms of duration, repetition and consistency. Although the detail is sure to vary 
from case to case the more general point is that since there are only so many hours 
in a day, recruitment and defection to more and less demanding practices go hand 
in hand. 
At the level of practice-as-performance, habits break when previously 
committed carriers persistently fail to re-enact the practice in question. In some 
situations the fact that a habit, i.e. a recurrent pattern of doing, is broken does not 
necessarily mean that the carrier is no longer a practitioner. Many practices can be 
continued but on a more infrequent or erratic basis. There are, however, cases in 
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which the regularity of performance is itself essential. In these situations erratic or 
inconsistent enactment is in effect a form of abandonment and/or defection.
For a practice-as-entity, losing habit-demanding status does not spell instant 
demise, but it does imply a repositioning in the temporal ordering of daily life. Home 
laundering is a good example. Not so long ago it was normal to set aside the best 
part of a day and do all the week’s washing on a Monday. Laundering remains an 
established practice, but the details of performance and timing have changed, as 
has the relation between washing clothes and other habit-demanding practices. In 
many households today, laundering involves a series of relatively brief episodes of 
attention – sorting, loading, drying, ironing – often spread across a number of days 
(Shove 2003). For some people, these moments remain thoroughly habitual, but 
for others the timing is much more erratic.  In this case the elements of laundering 
have changed (automatic washing machines have become normal, newly 
demanding interpretations of freshness have taken hold) in ways that matter for 
how the practice is positioned in relation to a host of other also changing practices, 
and for the kinds of temporal injunction involved. 
Stepping back from this one example and changing scale, we might think about 
the extent to which shared sociotemporal rhythms are defined by widespread or 
dominant practices that demand recurrent reproduction. At one extreme we might 
imagine a society in which daily life is governed by endlessly repeating sequences, 
as in some kind of monastic regime. In situations like these and in others in which 
habit-like-practices capture many people at once, their reproduction generates 
shared temporal rhythms. It is harder to imagine an equally extreme world in which 
there is little or no repetition, and few if any injunctions to re-enact.  Even so, it is 
clear that understanding the character of shared temporal orders is in essence 
a matter of understanding how sequences and sets of practices (some rarely 
enacted, others habitually reproduced) fit together. 
The details of exactly when practices-that-need-recurrent-reproduction are 
routinely enacted is also key. It is so in that habitual arrangements like those that 
in aggregate constitute morning rush hours or rhythms of sleeping and waking, 
watching TV or using the internet set the scene in which future habit-demanding 
practices might take hold. These shared rhythms are, in turn, important for the 
supply, or scarcity, of hosts capable of carrying habit-demanding practices and for 
where suitable carriers might be found. There is more to say about how practices 
are sequenced and scheduled and about how temporal demands evolve, but it is 
already clear that habits (practices that are recurrently and consistently reproduced) 
are not made and broken at will. 
It is also obvious that habitual practices-as-entities structure each other in real 
time, and over the longer run. There are various ways in which this works. If new 
The Habits of Consumption
108
habits are to take hold, they have to find recruits who are not already locked into 
existing patterns and sequences of practice. To understand the dynamics of habit 
we therefore need to figure out how certain practices constitute what Pred (1977) 
describes as “dominant” projects, capable of commanding significant resources of 
time and attention and thereby limiting the range of other possible practices by which 
individuals might be caught. We also need to consider the forms of compulsion 
on which habits depend, and the types of “stickyness” that ensue. For example, 
going to work or to school, taking a daily shower or doing yoga in the morning 
might be similarly recurrent, but significantly different with respect to the forms 
of capture involved, and hence the potential for defection. This is complicated in 
that for certain practices, levels of commitment are themselves dynamic: this is so 
when recurrent participation engenders further obligation, or when people become 
self-governing subjects disciplined by the demands of the practices they carry. 
More prosaically, habits structure each other and the potential for future 
development by structuring the definition and allocation of relevant elements. 
If habits are to endure, carriers need ready and consistent access to requisite 
materials, meanings and forms of competence. On this point it is important to 
recognise that the necessarily uneven distribution of such elements is itself a 
consequence and an outcome of previous habits and practices. 
These few paragraphs give a sense of the characteristics of habit-demanding 
practices. They also provide some insight into how habitual practices (as entities) 
develop, and how they structure each other by structuring the distribution of 
requisite elements and the availability of suitable hosts or carriers.  From this it is 
clear that the potential for future capture and defection is, to some, degree defined 
by existing commitments themselves born of practices past.  
Habits of analysis and policy intervention
In this final section I revisit some of the themes around which the more familiar 
literature on habit tends to revolve. This is useful as a means of comparing 
practice-based and other interpretations of habit, and in figuring out what different 
approaches mean for those wanting to steer patterns of ordinary consumption in a 
more sustainable direction. 
In the introduction I noted that distinctions between habitual and intentional 
behaviour are important in organising and ordering academic enquiry and in 
determining strategies for policy intervention. For Nicholas Stern, an economist, 
“Individuals and firms behave habitually and in response to social customs and 
expectations. This leads to ‘path dependency’, which limits their responses to 
policies designed to raise efficiency” (Stern Report, 2006, 381). In Stern’s analysis, 
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as in many others, habits gum up the otherwise smooth operation of policies and 
incentives designed with reference to a calculative model of individual behaviour. 
From the practice-centric point of view, this distinction is not one that makes much 
sense. After all, the crucial issue – for any one practice-as-entity - is that suitable 
cohorts of carriers have in fact been captured and that they are (for whatever 
stated reason) willing and able to keep the practice alive. In addition and in any 
event, seemingly rational and seemingly norm-governed actions/practices might 
be of the habit-demanding type but equally, they might not. In sum, there is nothing 
about the analytic split between rational choice and “norm” governing that helps in 
understanding how people and resources are recurrently captured. 
What then of the contrast between automaticity and deliberation? This second 
persistent theme is important for those who define habits as unreflexive actions 
and who argue that change only comes about when automatic behaviours are 
flipped into the realm of overt consciousness (Wilk 2002). However, the presence 
or absence of deliberation is of little relevance for whether practices are recurrently 
and faithfully reproduced or for how carriers are captured. As a result there is no 
reason to suppose that people can be released from the grip of habitual practices 
by consciousness raising or by bringing taken-for-granted arrangements into view. 
A third theme, again important in writing about habit, has to do with questions of 
strength. As Hal Wilhite puts it, “The weaker the habit, the more vulnerable it is to 
change” (Wilhite 2011). What does this mean from a practice-perspective? There 
are different possible interpretations of strength and weakness depending on 
whether we focus on practice-as-performance or practice-as-entity.  For any one 
carrier, strength of habit probably equates to degree of commitment. Accordingly, 
practices that are habit-demanding would be “strong” when they command 
unwavering devotion. If we change the point of reference and consider the strength 
of a practice-as-entity, this quality would probably relate to the number and extent 
of carriers that are so committed. Hence a practice-demanding habit would be 
“strong” (as an entity) if it were widely reproduced and consistently enacted.  
However, various examples of practice-collapse suggest that strength (in terms 
of being widespread and embedded) does not guarantee longevity or persistence. 
Consider the rapid decline of commuter cycling. In the early 1950s in the UK, around 
40% of journeys to work were by bike. In less than twenty years this dropped to 
just a few percent (Pooley and Turnbull 2000). For a while, cycling to work qualified 
as a strong habit-demanding practice that was locked into a whole set of social 
and institutional arrangements. As things turned out, this interdependence proved 
to be a source of weakness, not of strength. During the 1960s and 70s, the entire 
cycle-based regime caved in as automobility took hold. One by one, hundreds and 
thousands of previously committed cyclists abandoned this mode of travel and in 
so doing reinforced the dominance of the car. From the perspective sketched here, 
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there is no reason to suppose that habit-demanding practices change any slower 
than other types of practice, or that they are necessarily more durable. Rather, the 
need for recurrent performance in a landscape in which other practices are on the 
move is, if anything, an especially demanding condition to sustain. 
So far it seems that issues which dominate and in a sense define the more 
established literature on habits bear little or no relation to processes that matter 
from a practice-centric point of view. This is something of a problem in that policy 
strategies to promote more sustainable consumption reflect, and are inspired by 
the mainstream agenda. Where does this leave a practice-based analysis of habit? 
What might policy makers do with the idea that people are captured by practices, 
and that some of these practices make strong demands in terms of regular, habit-
like reproduction? More directly, are there ways of intervening so as to stifle “bad” 
practices and promote “good” ones? 
I finish with a handful of practical suggestions. One is to recognise that not all 
habits are problematic. In policy discussions of sustainable consumption, habits 
generally figure as something to be broken in order to permit choice. But certain 
habitually enacted practices are already relatively benign. The challenge is thus 
not one of overcoming habit but of developing strategies capable of promoting 
and sustaining the recurrent reproduction of low impact arrangements, and of 
undermining those that are much more resource intensive. What might this entail? 
As described above, habit-demanding practices (whether good or bad) are 
those in which recurrence and frequent enactment has become an aspect of 
proper performance: doing well means doing often. Making and breaking habits 
consequently depends on either building or shattering this sort of temporal 
association.  In the past, policy initiatives like those designed to instil habits of 
personal hygiene (Geels 2005) have emphasised the need for regularity, equally, 
others have focussed on abstinence, for instance in relation to drinking or the 
consumption of unhealthy food. Whilst typically shy of specifying exactly when or 
how practices should be enacted, contemporary policy making depends on many 
such assumptions. For example, estimates of future water or energy demand 
necessarily embody understandings about what constitutes a “normal” standard of 
living and about the regular and recurrent enactment the practices of which such 
standards are composed. In this sense, policy has a hand in reproducing versions 
of normality, and of normally recurrent consumption and practice.
If habit-demanding practices are to retain this status, the elements of which 
they are comprised (materials, meaning, competence) must be readily and reliably 
available. In policy terms, damaging or extracting one or more of these elements 
represents a very practical means of habit de-formation. This is more familiar 
territory. For example, laws that ban the use of certain objects simply remove them 
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from the field of practice. Less obvious, but no less significant, past and present 
investment in infrastructure, business regulation and economic policy are surely 
relevant for the availability and circulation of the many elements on which more 
and less sustainable habits depend. In these ways policy has a direct bearing on 
the dynamics of habit.
Third, and on a rather more systemic scale, the infrastructures and institutions 
that sustain the habitual reproduction of certain practices (and not others) also 
structure patterns of present and future access. This is important in that such 
arrangements configure cohorts of actual and potential carriers and their chances 
of being captured by one habit or another. In so far as governments have a hand 
in processes that are important for the distribution of relevant elements, they also 
have a hand in facilitating and limiting the number of people that a habit might catch 
and the social groups from which they might be drawn.
In conclusion, policy makers are actively involved in making and shaping the 
conditions in which we become the creatures of habit. This suggests that there 
might well be scope for intervening such that more sustainable habits capture larger 
sections of the population, and such that other less sustainable ones are edged out 
of the way.  Developing such a programme depends on a fairly radical turnaround 
in how habits are conceptualised and in how habit-changing agendas are framed. 
It may not happen any time soon but there is a chance that policy makers and the 
advisers and researchers on whom they depend may yet be “caught” by new habits 
of thought, and perhaps captivated by some of the ideas that I have outlined here.
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